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- Written by: Amardeo Sarma
When I started skeptical activities in the early 1980s, I assumed that there was a millennia-old tradition in which the principles of skepticism had been developed. It soon became apparent that it wasn't that simple and that there was no such thing as skepticism per se.
I learned a lot over time. It was about what is true and what is not and to what extent we can know anything at all. It was also about how we should proceed in the knowledge process and in communication. Then, we had to ask ourselves why we were doing this in the first place.
Our knowledge itself
The ancient skeptics were convinced that we cannot really know anything because there is a counterargument for everything. They believed that we should suspend judgment on basically any assertion. This has nothing to do with science. The book "The New Skepticism" by Paul Kurtz provides a clear explanation of this complex development, which involved skepticism being developed in a new, modern, and science-compatible sense.
Gerhard Vollmer, a long-standing member of the GWUP's Scientific Advisory Board, makes his point even more clearly in "Wissenschaftstheorie im Einsatz": Our scientific statements must relate to the real world, which exists independently of us.
Another essential aspect is epistemic modesty. This includes the fact that nothing is absolutely certain, even if we know that some things have a lot of evidence. We must always be open to new ideas and considerations, even if they initially seem wrong.
Given these considerations, we can now present a few principles that should guide skeptics.
- Science aims to describe the real world correctly with its theories, at least approximately. This requires empirical testability.
- All people are equally the product of evolution and corresponding adaptations to the world. Therefore, all people are equally capable of understanding the world. Therefore, science is universalistic. Let's be skeptical of anyone who talks about Chinese, Vedic or feminist science.
- There are different levels of knowledge. Some are still provisional, while we can be quite certain about others. This justifies our epistemic modesty: we must be open to correction and ready for new evidence and arguments.
- Wishful thinking and self-deception exist in science as in any other field. We can build up moralising barriers and immunise ourselves against criticism. Magicians like James Randi have shown us how easy it is for us – especially scientists – to deceive ourselves. This is why engaging in substantive and methodological criticism is crucial to correct errors, discover blind spots and develop new ideas.
- The arguments, not the people and their affiliations, are what count. Even if we don't like these people for other reasons, we mustn't let that influence our assessment of their arguments. A rational and constructive approach to unpopular theses is fundamental to the scientific process. After all, we could be wrong.
- There must be no taboos in the pursuit of knowledge. It goes without saying that there are ethical limits to the methods. For example, we do not carry out human experiments.
Dealing with Others
Dealing with others, especially opponents we don't like, has two components. First, they could present arguments that advance our knowledge, be it in the matter itself or in their assessment of why they believe something. Secondly, we have to treat others decently.
There are excellent guides for dealing with unfounded claims, such as "Proper Criticism" by Ray Hyman. It provides clear guidance on how to deal with these topics. Communication is also crucial. We must always treat our opponents with care.
Practically, this means being firm on the issue but polite in tone and behaviour. Insults and insinuations of motives have no place in a good relationship, especially not a scientifically skeptical one. Ad hominem arguments have no place in a fair discussion. Someone can be a scoundrel and still be right. Another person can be likeable and still be wrong. This is about arguments, not people.
Why are we doing this?
We don't like to be deceived. We want to know how things really are. Nobody likes to be deceived.
But there is another reason, which the first president of the GWUP, Irmgard Oepen, made clear to us: "It's not about being right; it's about protecting the patient." Put another way: Nobody wants to make detrimental or harmful decisions due to false information. The consequences of misleading information must be considered.
One thing is clear: the people affected make their own decisions and have the right to make the wrong decision, but they must accept the consequences. The attitude described in the previous section is also crucial here. Even if we make accurate and truthful statements, we will be ignored if we are perceived as merely representing a political or ideological orientation.
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- Written by: Amardeo Sarma
The relationship between science and politics is often debated. How do they influence each other, and how does this interaction affect trust in science?
Let's start by concentrating on the sciences and history. We will not enter the realms of art, literature and music. We are concerned with the real world and what actually exists - whether our ideas, hypotheses and theories correspond to reality. Examples are physical laws, historical events, or the link between childhood trauma and violence. These propositions are empirically verifiable and may fail in the face of reality. "Gerhard Vollmer, a long-standing member of the GWUP's scientific council, aptly put it.
Whether something is considered true or not depends on the evidence. The theory of evolution, for example, has an immense amount of well-established evidence, and it would take a similar amount of contrary evidence to shake it. By contrast, predictions about the Earth's future temperature are not quite as certain and can be changed more easily as new evidence emerges.
Now, science cannot tell us directly what to do. But there is one exception: when it comes to the presentation of scientific results themselves, we can, for example, politically demand that unproven creationism not be taught as science in schools.
But "science" should not give concrete recommendations for action, such as "go organic", "use only renewable energy" or "introduce genetic engineering". The motto "follow the science" is out of place here. Instead, we should demand that politicians take scientific evidence into account, not ignore or negate it - a subtle but essential distinction. The Scientists for the Future initiative goes far beyond this, advocating certain specific policies while rejecting others.
Science and politics: disentanglement for trust
Science can undoubtedly contribute to policy issues, especially regarding whether specific measures can achieve the policy goals set. Unfortunately, policy decisions often do not sufficiently account for such scientific evidence.
The relationship between science and policy can affect trust in science. Many intuitively feel that other interests and beliefs play a role alongside scientific facts in some debates. This perception can undermine trust in science.
A new publication by Senja Post and Nils Bienzeisler from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) entitled "The Honest Broker versus the Epistocrat: Attenuating Distrust in Science by Disentangling Science from Politics" examines this aspect from a different perspective. The results suggest that a clear separation between scientific and political statements could help to strengthen trust in scientific information.
Political controversies on scientific issues often show a polarisation of trust in science. This trust often correlates with individual political preferences. Interestingly, intelligence reinforces this polarisation, regardless of the truth of the statements.
Testing the hypothesis
Post and Bienzeisler tested their thesis experimentally on three German political conflicts:
- School closures vs. school openings during the COVID-19 pandemic
- Ban vs. continuation of domestic air traffic in Germany in the face of climate change
- Shooting wolves in populated areas vs. protecting these areas
In each case study, participants saw one of four versions of a news article in which a scientist reported on their research and gave policy advice. The scientist's quotes differed in the direction and style of his policy advice.
As an epistocrat, the scientist blurs the distinction between scientific and political statements by purporting to "prove" a policy, precluding social debate about values and policy priorities.
On the other hand, an honest broker distinguishes between scientific and political statements and presents a policy option, acknowledging the limitations of their disciplinary scientific perspective on a broader societal problem.
The authors conclude that public policy advice in the style of an honest broker, as opposed to an epistocrat, can reduce political polarisation and increase trust in scientists and scientific knowledge, especially among the most politically challenged groups.
They conclude that practitioners of public science communication who deal with scientific or technological issues in public controversies should take note of these findings and consider them in their professional contributions to science and policy communication. They believe that an honest broker style, as opposed to an epistocratic style, could contribute to depolarisation and greater trust in scientists.
Two reasons in favour of disentanglement
There are two reasons for decoupling science and policy. First, science cannot, of its own accord, make recommendations for action outside its sphere of interest. Second, it does not even help science's reputation. On the contrary, too close a relationship with policymakers undermines public trust in science.